We evaluate the impact of two proposed regulations of transportation network companies (TNCs) like Uber, Lyft and Didi: (1) a minimum wage for drivers, and (2) a cap on the number of drivers or vehicles. The impact is assessed using a queuing theoretic equilibrium model, which incorporates the stochastic dynamics of the app-based ride-hailing matching platform, the ride prices and driver wages established by the platform, and the incentives of passengers and drivers. We show that a floor placed under driver earnings pushes the ride-hailing platform to hire more drivers, at the same time that passengers enjoy faster and cheaper rides, while platform rents are reduced. Contrary to standard economic theory, enforcing a minimum wage for drivers benefits both drivers and passengers, and promotes the efficiency of the entire system. This surprising outcome holds for a large range of model parameters, and it occurs because the quality of service measured by passenger pickup time improves as the number of drivers increases. In contrast to a wage floor, imposing a cap on the number of vehicles hurts drivers, because the platform reaps all the benefits of limiting supply. We also construct variants of the model to discuss platform subsidy, platform competition, and autonomous vehicles. (Pravin Varaiya) 1 The utilization rate is calculated as the total amount of time drivers spend transporting passengers on trips dispatched by the base divided by the total amount of time drivers are available to accept dispatches from the base [1]. Wheelchair accessible vehicles receive a higher rate.  Click to edit Master text styles  Second level  Third level  Fourth level  Fifth level Regulation Policy Platform Decisions Market Equilibrium Ride Hailing Platform City Council passengers drivers
Introduction
In December 2018, New York became the first U.S. city to adopt a minimum wage for drivers working for app-based transportation network companies (TNCs) like Uber and Lyft. The New York City Taxi and Limousine Commission (NYTLC) established a "minimum per-trip payment formula" that gave an estimated gross hourly driver earnings before expenses of at least $27.86 per hour and a net income of $17.22 per hour after expenses, equivalent to the minimum wage of $15 per hour because, as "independent contractors," drivers pay additional payroll taxes and get no paid time off [1] . The The Commission imposed the wage floor based on testimony on driver expenses, meetings with stakeholders, and on the report of labor economists J.A. Parrott and M. Reich [2] which showed that median driver earnings had declined almost $3.00 per hour from $25.78 in September 2016 to $ 22.90 in October 2017, a decrease of 11.17%. The TNCs imposed the $3.00 per hour wage cut during a period when the number of drivers in the largest four TNCs (Uber, Lyft, Gett/Juno, and Via) had grown by 80,000 [1] . Uber would be the largest for-profit private employer in New York City if its drivers were classified as employees rather than independent contractors [2] .
The subminimum wage of drivers working for TNCs also prompted the Seattle City Council in April 2018 to pass a unanimous resolution to explore setting a minimum base rate of $2.40 per mile for TNCs compared with the prevailing rate of $1.35 per mile and the rate of $2.70 per mile charged by taxis [3] . The resolution also asked TNCs to voluntarily hand over anonymous data on hours, trips, fares and compensation. Unlike NYTLC, however, no other US city has access to TNC data to estimate what their drivers are paid.
In December 2018, Uber lost its case at the U.K. Court of Appeal against the October, 2016, ruling that its drivers should be classified as workers entitled to rights such as minimum wage and paid holidays. The Court ruled against Uber's claim that its drivers were just self-employed contractors who use its app in exchange for a share of their fares at the level dictated by Uber [4] . The case can be used to challenge the self-employed status of millions of gig-economy workers who work for companies like Airbnb and Deliveroo on a freelance basis without fixed contracts. New York and London are the largest Uber markets in the U.S. and E.U.
Uber's reaction to these three adverse decisions was predictable. Responding to the NYTLC ruling Uber's director of public affairs stated, "legislation to increase driver earnings will lead to higher than necessary fare increases for riders while missing an opportunity to deal with congestion in Manhattan's central business district" [5] . 2 Uber challenged the Seattle resolution: its general manager for Seattle said, "we are generally unclear how nearly doubling per-mile rider rates would not result in an increased cost for riders" [3] . Uber also declared it would fight the U.K. Appeal Court's decision in the Supreme Court [4] . Contradicting Uber's claims, this study shows that, for a large range of parameter values, raising driver wages will increase the number of drivers at the same time that passengers enjoy faster and cheaper rides, while platform rents are reduced.
The aforementioned regulations are in part responding to the public anxiety over the disruption of the urban transportation system caused by the rapid growth of TNCs. Worldwide, the monthly number of Uber users is forecast to reach 100 million in 2018, up from 75 million in 2017. In New York, the four largest TNCs Uber, Lyft, Juno and Via combined dispatched nearly 600,000 rides per day in the first quarter of 2018, increasing their annual trip totals by over 100 percent in 2016 and by 71 percent in 2017. About 80,000 vehicles are affiliated with these four companies [2] . In San Francisco, 5,700 TNC vehicles operate in peak times. They daily make over 170,000 vehicle trips, approximately 12 times the number of taxi trips, and 15 percent of all intra-San Francisco trips, comprising at least 9 percent of all San Francisco person trips [6] . This explosive growth of TNCs has raised two public concerns.
As noted earlier, one concern is with the working conditions of TNC drivers. The TNC business model places much of the economic risk associated with the app sector on drivers, who are classified as independent contractors. Furthermore, the model relies on having many idle cars and drivers, resulting in low driver pay per hour and high TNC platform rents. 3 Uber's annual revenue from passenger fares in New York City amounts to about $2 billion, of which it keeps about $375 million in commissions and fees, for a markup estimated at six times its variable operating cost or 600 percent [2] . One common opinion is that "Uber's driver-partners are attracted to the flexible schedules that driving on the Uber platform affords . . . because the nature of the work, the flexibility, and the compensation appeals to them compared with other available options [7] ." In fact, more than 60 percent of New York City drivers work full-time and provide 80 percent of all rides; their work hours are not flexible [2] .
The second concern is with the negative impact of TNCs on a city's traffic congestion and its public transit ridership. A detailed 2017 report [8] examined the impact of TNC growth on traffic conditions in Manhattan's CBD. The analysis shows that, from 2013 to 2017, TNC trips increased 15 percent, VMT increased 36 percent, traffic speed declined 15 percent, the number of vehicles increased 59 percent, and the number of unoccupied vehicles increased 81 percent. The report suggested reducing the unoccupied time of TNC vehicles as a means of congestion control. Responding to the increased congestion, the New York City Council in 2018 passed a regulation freezing the number of TNC vehicles on the road for one year. Supporters of the cap, including Mayor Bill de Blasio, said the regulation will protect drivers, fairly regulate the industry and reduce congestion [9] . However, our analysis shows that imposing a cap hurts drivers, because the TNC retains as profit the benefits of limiting supply.
Another detailed report [6] by San Francisco Transportation Authority provides information on the size, location, and time-of-day characteristics of TNC activities in San Francisco. A follow-up report [10] identifies the impact of TNC activities on road congestion in San Francisco County. It shows that after subtracting the impact of employment growth, population change, and network capacity change, TNCs contributed 51 percent of the increase in vehicle hours of delay, 47 percent of increase in VMT, and 55 percent of the average speed decline between 2010 and 2016. Moreover, "TNC trips are concentrated in the densest and most congested parts of San Francisco including the downtown and northeastern core of the city. At peak periods, TNCs are estimated to comprise 25 percent of vehicle trips in South of Market." The report cites studies showing that "between 43 percent and 61 percent of TNC trips substitute for transit, walk, or bike travel or would not have been made at all." This paper evaluates two TNC regulations: a minimum driver wage, and a cap on the number of drivers or vehicles. We analyze the impacts of these regulations on several aspects of the the app-based ride-hailing market, including ride prices and driver wages established by the platform, the incentives of passengers and drivers, vehicle occupancy rate, and platform rent or profit. We use a model to determine the arrival of passengers, number of drivers, ride prices and platform commissions, conditioned on the imposed regulation. The model employs a queuing theoretic model with dynamic matching of passengers and drivers, an equilibrium model that predicts the long-term average arrivals of passengers and drivers, and an optimization model of platform decision-making. We summarize the key results.
• Imposing a minimum wage will motivate TNCs to hire more drivers, and passengers to enjoy faster and cheaper rides, while TNC rent or profit shrinks. In contrast with the traditional economic model [11] , raising the minimum wage will benefit both drivers and passengers, while TNC rents will decline. This counter-intuitive result holds for a large regime of model parameters, and it occurs because the quality of service measured by passenger pickup time increases with the number of drivers. Consequently, by hiring more drivers the platform improves the quality of service and attracts more passengers. For a large range of values of the minimum wage, the increased sales outweighs the increased labor cost.
• Contrary to common belief, a cap on the number of drivers will hurt driver earnings. This is because when fewer drivers are permitted, the platform will hire cheaper labor by reducing driver pay. Thus, the benefit of limiting the driver supply is retained by the platform.
We also present variants of our model to analyze platform subsidy, platform competition and autonomous vehicles.
minimum driver wage, maximum number of vehicles and regional licensing. 4 The regulations are enforced by auditing the operational data of TNCs. (See [1] for details of enforcement in New York.) The platform responds to the regulations by setting profit-maximizing ride fares and driver commissions (or equivalently, wages). These fares and wages are called 'platform decisions' in Figure 1 . The platform decisions influence the choices of passengers and drivers. For instance, passengers have diverse ride choices including TNC, public transit, walking, and biking. They select an option based on the cost and convenience of each choice. Drivers also have alternative job opportunities, such as delivering food, grocery, packages, and mail. They take the job with the highest expected wage. The choices of passengers and drivers form a market equilibrium, which determines the TNC profit or rent. The equilibrium is affected by regulations.
The objective of the paper is to understand how regulations impact the ride-hailing transportation system. We consider two regulations: (a) a floor under driver wage; and (b) a cap on total number of drivers. We analyze their impact from various perspectives of the ride-hailing system, including ride fares, commission rate, passenger pickup time, driver earnings, platform rent, number of riders, number of for-hire vehicles, and vehicle occupancy rate.
We present the model for the ride-hailing system in two steps. In Section 3 we introduce the market equilibrium model of the response of passengers and drivers to a given platform decision. In Section 4 we predict TNC decisions in the absence of regulation. In Section 5 we examine TNC decision operating with a floor under driver wage rate. In Section 6 we consider TNC decisions when there is a cap on the number of drivers. Platform competition and other model variations are discussed in Section 7. Conclusions are offered in Section 8.
Market Equilibrium Model
This section develops the market equilibrium model of the decisions of drivers and passengers in response to the platform decision. The model is used to predict the average arrival rates of passengers and number of drivers.
Matching Passengers and Drivers: M/G/N Queue
We develop a continuous-time queuing process to model the matching of passengers and drivers. Consider N TNC drivers or vehicles, each modeled as a server. A vehicle is 'busy' if there is a passenger on board or if it is assigned a passenger and on its way to picking her up. Otherwise, it is considered 'idle'. We assume that the arrival process of passengers is Poisson with rate λ > 0. Newly arrived passengers immediately join the queue and wait until an idle vehicle is dispatched by the platform. Hence this is an M/G/N queue, and the expected number of idle servers (vehicles) is N − λ/µ, where µ −1 is the average trip duration.
Passenger and Driver Incentives
While the queuing model captures the stochastic dynamics, the passenger arrival rate λ and the number of drivers N are endogenously determined as a market equilibrium.
Passenger Incentives: Passengers choose their rides from available options like app-based TNCs, public transit, walking, or biking, by comparing their prices and waiting times. We model the cost of the app-based ride-hailing service as
in which t w is the average waiting time (from sending a request to being picked up), p f is the fare per unit distance of the ride-hailing service 5 , and α and β specify the passenger's trade-off between convenience and money. Note that p f is the price per unit distance, and total distance is lumped into β.
In the ride-hailing service, a ride is initiated when a passenger sends a request to the platform and completed when the passenger is dropped off at the destination. We divide a ride into three periods: (1) from a request being sent to a vehicle being assigned; (2) from a vehicle being assigned to the passenger being picked up;
(3) from the passenger being picked up to drop off. Let t m , t p and t o be the average duration of these periods. Then t m is the average waiting time in the M/G/N queue. Assuming that the platform matches the passenger to the nearest idle vehicle, t p depends on the distance of the nearest idle vehicle to the passenger. Typically, t m ranges from a couple of seconds to a half minute, and t p is between three to six minutes. Since t m is much smaller than t p , we neglect t m throughout the rest of this paper and call t p as the passenger waiting time, i.e. t w = t m + t p t p .
Remark 1. The ride confirmation time t m is negligible for Uber and Lyft. However, in some markets (such as Didi in China), the government restricts the entry of for-hire drivers for passenger safety, which leads to a much higher t m during peak hours. We note that this case can be captured by adding t m into t w , where t m is the average waiting time of the M/G/N queue.
To estimate the pickup time t p , we assume that the idle vehicles are uniformly and independently distributed across the city of arbitrary shape. We also assume that the location of passengers requesting a ride is also uniformly distributed across the city, independently of the position of idle vehicles. The following proposition provides an estimate of the average pickup time.
Proposition 1. Let d(x) denote the distance of a passenger requesting a ride at location x in a city to the nearest idle vehicle. Then,
The result implies that the average pickup time t p is (approximately) inversely proportional to the square root of the average number of idle vehicles since t p = Ex{d(x)|N I idle vehicles} v , with v representing the average traffic speed. This results can be explained intuitively as follows. Consider a square shaped city of unit size with N I idle vehicles located in a grid with each idle car equally distant from its four closest neighbors to its left, right, top, or bottom. Then the shortest distance between idle cars is equal to 1 √ N I
. Th exact proof of Proposition 1 for a city of general shape and when the locations of idle vehicles and passengers are random is deferred to Appendix.
In (3) we select N I 0 as a reference so that
can be computed from available TNC data for a city. For instance, at peak hours, Manhattan has 12, 000 TNC vehicles on the road. Every minute there are 140 new TNC trips. Each trip takes around 12 minutes [8] , and passengers wait 3-5 minutes for pickup. In this case we have N = 12, 000, λ = 140 trips/min, µ = 1/12 min −1 , and the average pickup time is 4 min. Pick N I 0 = N − λ/µ 10000, then
Ex{d(x)|N I 0 idle vehicles} v 4min, and the pickup time function (3) becomes:
Remark 2. The estimation in Proposition 1 has approximation error O(N −1 I 0 + (1+(
)N −1 I ) for large N and N I 0 . Medium to big sized cities usually have a few thousands of TNC vehicles 6 , so (3) is a good approximation of the average pickup time for practical parameter values. We also point out that the queuing model used in Proposition 1 predicts the number of idle vehicles. Therefore in the following we use the following approximation
where
Passengers have a reservation cost that summarizes their other travel options: if the TNC travel cost c is greater than the reservation cost, the passenger abandons the TNC for an alternative choice. We assume that the reservation costs of passengers are heterogeneous, and let F p (c) be the cumulative distribution of reservation costs. The passenger arrival rate then is given by
in which λ 0 is the arrival rates of potential passengers (all travel demands in the city). According to (5) , the passengers that use the app-based ride-hailing service are potential passengers excepting those who abandon the platform because its cost is greater than their reservation cost.
Remark 3. The model incorporates the passenger's sensitivity both to ride fares and pickup times. In (5) , t m is ignored since it is an order of magnitude smaller than t p . In addition, since t o does not depend on λ or N , we absorb it into F p as a constant.
Driver Incentives: Drivers are sensitive to earnings and respond to the offered wage by joining or leaving the platform. The average hourly wage of TNC drivers is
wherein p d is the per distance payment the driver receives from the platform. We assume that the platform keeps the difference between p f and p d as its commission or profit.
The average hourly wage (6) is derived as follows. The total platform payment to all drivers sums up to λp d . Therefore, the average hourly wage per driver is simply λp d divided by N . Note that we have neglected a constant factor that captures the time span (one hour) and trip distance (since p f is the per distance payment).
Each driver considering working for the TNC has a reservation wage: if the reservation wage is smaller the driver joins the TNC. We assume that the reservation wages of drivers are heterogeneous, and F d (c) is the cumulative distribution of reservation wages across the population. Hence
in which N 0 is the number of potential drivers (all drivers seeking a job). According to (7) , the number of TNC drivers is the total number of potential drivers multiplied by the proportion that actually join the platform since their reservation wage is smaller than w.
Remark 4. In practice, both supply and demand of a ride-hailing system vary within a day. This can be captured in a quasi-static analysis by varying the values of λ 0 and N 0 under peak-hours and off-peak hours.
TNC decisions in absence of regulation
The objective of the app-based ride-hailing platform changes over time. In the startup phase it subsidizes passengers and drivers to grow its business. Eventually it shifts to maximizing its profit. This section focuses on profit maximization assuming the platform is an unregulated monopoly. Platform subsidy and competition are discussed in Section 7.
Pricing without Regulation
The platform rent or profit is
Within a certain period (each day, say), λ trips are completed. Since the platform pockets (p f − p d )/mile from each trip, the total rent in this period is (8) . For simplicity, we ignore a constant factor that accounts for the average trip time and distance.
In the absence of regulation, the platform maximizes its rent subject to the market equilibrium constraints:
To avoid a trivial case, we make the following assumption throughout the paper: Assumption 1. There exist strictly positive λ, N, p f , p d satisfying (10) .
This assumption rules out the situation in which passenger reservation costs are so low and driver reservation wages are so high that supply and demand curves do not intersect.
Since (9) is not a convex problem, it is not straightforward to find its solution. One approach is via numerical computation as in [14] . This is suitable for small problems. Alternatively, we can proceed analytically. We view λ = λ(p f , p d ) as a function of p f and p d determined implicitly by (10) . The first order necessary conditions of (9) then reduce to
For non-convex problems, these conditions are only necessary. However, they are sufficient in the following case.
Proposition 2. Assume that the reservation cost and the reservation wage are uniformly distributed, F p (c) = min{e p c, 1} and F d (w) = min{e d w, 1}, wherein e p ∈ R and e d ∈ R are constants. Then the following equations have a unique solution (p f , p d , λ, N ) 7 , which is the globally optimal solution to (9) .
The proof of Proposition 2 is deferred to the Appendix. Thus (9) can be effectively computed by solving for the unique solution of (12) . Of course if the conditions of Proposition 2 do not hold, we can still solve (9) by obtaining all solutions to (12) and picking the most profitable one.
Example: We consider a numerical example for which we calculate the platform's profit-maximizing decision (9) based on Proposition 2. Assume that the reservation cost of passengers and the reservation wage of drivers are both uniformly distributed. In the sequel, we vary λ 0 to investigate how the platform decision changes with the number of potential passengers at different times of the day (λ 0 is large during peak hours). The model parameters (N 0 , λ 0 ,α, β) are selected so that the resulting solution to (9) matches realistic data: N 0 = 10, 000, λ ∈ [500, 1000] ride/min, α = 4.5, β = 4.8.
The results are shown in Figures 2-7. As λ 0 increases, the number of passengers (λ) and drivers (N ) both increase. At the same time, occupancy rate ( Figure 4 ), and the ride price increase ( Figure 5 ). At peak hours, the drivers benefit since they earn more ( Figure 6 ), but the passengers travel at a higher cost (2) due to the increased trip fare.
It is worth noting that as the number of potential passengers doubles from 500 to 1,000 rides per minute, the cost per ride increases by 11 percent from $2.4 to $2.7 per mile, driver payment increases by 6.6 percent from $1.4 to $1.5 per mile. However, driver wages increase 29 percent from $17 to $24 per hour because the occupancy or driver utilization increases by 25 percent from 0.4 to 0.5. By the same token, in the absence of a wage floor, a driver's hourly wage declines by 29 percent from peak to off-peak hours. Thus in the absence of a wage floor, the drivers bear most of the risk of shifts in demand.
TNC decisions with wage floor
This section is devoted to platform pricing with a wage floor. A cap on the number of drivers is considered in Section 6.
A driver minimum wage w imposes the constraint λp d /N ≥ w 8 . After a wage floor is imposed the platform may find it too expensive to hire all drivers who wish to join and limit the entry of new drivers. We capture this by relaxing the supply equation (10b) to the inequality (15b), and cast the pricing problem as
500 600 700 800 900 1K 2K 3K 4K Potential Passenger /minute Number of Drivers 
Constraint (15b) indicates that the platform can hire up to the number of all available drivers. N is now an additional decision variable.
Problem (14) is also non-convex. However, we can nd the optimal solution based on rst order conditions for the following case.
Proposition 3. Assume that the distributions of the reservation cost and reservation wage are uniform: F p (c) = min{e p c, 1} and F d (w) = min{e d w, 1}, wherein e p ∈ R and e d ∈ R are constants. Then the rst order conditions of (14) admit a unique solution (p f , p d , λ, N ), which is the globally optimal solution to (14) .
The proof of Proposition 3 is deferred to Appendix. Thus the prot-maximizing pricing problem (14) can be found by solving the rst order conditions. We point out that the rst order conditions of (14) branch into three cases depending on which inequality constraint is binding: only (15b) binds; only (15c) binds; both (15b) and (15c) bind. We discuss these cases in the proof of Proposition 3 in the Appendix.
A Cheap-Lunch Theorem
Example: We consider a numerical example for which we calculate the prot-maximizing price (14) for dierent wage oors w. We select the model parameters (N 0 , λ 0 , α, β) so that the resulting solution to (14) matches realistic data: N 0 = 10, 000, λ 0 = 700 ride/min, α = 4.5, β = 4.8. 
The proof of Proposition 3 is deferred to Appendix. Thus the prot-maximizing pricing problem (14) can be found by solving the rst order conditions. We point out that the rst order conditions of (14) branch into three cases depending on which inequality constraint is binding: only (15b) binds; only (15c) binds;
both (15b) and (15c) bind. We discuss these cases in the proof of Proposition 3 in the Appendix.
Example: We consider a numerical example for which we calculate the prot-maximizing price (14) for dierent wage oors w. We select the model parameters (N 0 , λ 0 , α, β) so that the resulting solution to (14) matches realistic data:
N 0 = 10, 000, λ 0 = 700 ride/min, α = 4.5, β = 4.8. 
Problem (14) is also non-convex. However, we can find the optimal solution based on first order conditions for the following case.
Proposition 3. Assume that the distributions of the reservation cost and reservation wage are uniform:
, wherein e p ∈ R and e d ∈ R are constants. Then the first order conditions of (14) admit a unique solution (p f , p d , λ, N ), which is the globally optimal solution to (14) .
The proof of Proposition 3 is deferred to Appendix. Thus the profit-maximizing pricing problem (14) can be found by solving the first order conditions. We point out that the first order conditions of (14) "branch" into three cases depending on which inequality constraint is binding: only (15b) binds; only (15c) binds; both (15b) and (15c) bind. We discuss these cases in the proof of Proposition 3 in the Appendix.
Example: We consider a numerical example for which we calculate the profit-maximizing price (14) for different wage floors w. We select the model parameters (N 0 , λ 0 , α, β) so that the resulting solution to (14) matches realistic data: N 0 = 10, 000, λ 0 = 700 ride/min, α = 4.5, β = 4.8. We also assume that the reservation cost of passengers and the reservation wage of drivers are both uniformly distributed. Later we will show that our result holds for arbitrary distribution and model parameters. • w < $20.2: the wage oor is inactive and the solution to (14) is the same as that to (9) because even in the absence of the minimum wage constraint the platform sets w = $20.2 to attract enough drivers.
• $20.2 ≤ w < $29.8: both (15b) and (15c) constraints are active. As the minimum wage increases, the platform hires all drivers whose reservation wage is below the minimum wage, the ride cost (2) goes down, the quality of service (pickup time) improves, driver wage increases, more passengers are served, and the platform prot shrinks.
• w ≥ $29.8: only the wage oor constraint (15c) is active. As the minimum wage exceeds $29.8, the platform hires fewer drivers than wish to work, both ride fare (p f ) and pickup time (t p ) increase, fewer passengers take the ride-hailing option, the drivers who are hired earn more, and the platform prot shrinks further.
Remark 5. Under dierent parameters, it is possible to nd cases in which the trip fare p f decreases in the second regime. This is because when β is large (e.g., β = 18), passengers are more sensitive to trip fare, so reducing p f is more eective for attracting new passengers. Therefore, the platform nds it more protable to lower the trip fare even under a higher wage oor. However, we emphasize that regardless of β, the total travel cost (2) always decreases in the second regime.
Analysis: Labor market studies [11] would predict that raising the minimum wage will reduce driver employment and output (number of rides), and increase price. But this is contradicted by the market We also assume that the reservation cost of passengers and the reservation wage of drivers are both uniformly distributed. Later we will show that our result holds for arbitrary distribution and model parameters. • w < $20.2: the wage oor is inactive and the solution to (14) is the same as that to (9) because even in the absence of the minimum wage constraint the platform sets w = $20.2 to attract enough drivers.
Analysis: Labor market studies [11] would predict that raising the minimum wage will reduce driver employment and output (number of rides), and increase price. But this is contradicted by the market 11 We also assume that the reservation cost of passengers and the reservation wage of drivers are both uniformly distributed. Later we will show that our result holds for arbitrary distribution and model parameters. • w < $20.2: the wage oor is inactive and the solution to (14) is the same as that to (9) because even in the absence of the minimum wage constraint the platform sets w = $20.2 to attract enough drivers.
Analysis: Labor market studies [11] would predict that raising the minimum wage will reduce driver employment and output (number of rides), and increase price. But this is contradicted by the market 11 Figure 13 : Per mile ride price and driver payment.
We also assume that the reservation cost of passengers and the reservation wage of drivers are both uniformly distributed. Later we will show that our result holds for arbitrary distribution and model parameters. • w < $20.2: the wage floor is inactive and the solution to (14) is the same as that to (9) because even in the absence of the minimum wage constraint the platform sets w = $20.2 to attract enough drivers.
• $20.2 ≤ w < $29.8: both (15b) and (15c) constraints are active. As the minimum wage increases, the platform hires all drivers whose reservation wage is below the minimum wage, the ride cost (2) goes down, the quality of service (pickup time) improves, driver wage increases, more passengers are served, and the platform profit shrinks.
• w ≥ $29.8: only the wage floor constraint (15c) is active. As the minimum wage exceeds $29.8, the platform hires fewer drivers than wish to work, both ride fare (p f ) and pickup time (t p ) increase, fewer passengers take the ride-hailing option, the drivers who are hired earn more, and the platform profit shrinks further.
Remark 5. Under different parameters, it is possible to find cases in which the trip fare p f decreases in the second regime. This is because when β is large (e.g., β = 18), passengers are more sensitive to trip fare, so reducing p f is more effective for attracting new passengers. Therefore, the platform finds it more profitable to lower the trip fare even under a higher wage floor. However, we emphasize that regardless of β, the total travel cost (2) always decreases in the second regime.
Analysis: Labor market studies [11] would predict that raising the minimum wage will reduce driver employment and output (number of rides), and increase price. But this is contradicted by the market response in the second regime ($20.2 < w < $29.8), in which both drivers and passengers are better off as the minimum wage increases, at the expense of platform rent.
The ride-hailing market has a distinctive feature that is like a supply side network externality. As the number of drivers increases, so do the number and spatial density of idle drivers which, in turn, reduces pickup time (4) and increases service quality. This attracts more passengers who willingly pay a higher price p 2 for the ride, but whose total cost (2) is lower. The resulting increased revenue offsets the higher wage needed to attract more drivers. Since the pickup time t 2 is a decreasing convex function of the number N of drivers, this positive feedback is eventually exhausted when the wage reaches $29.2. At that wage, the number of drivers, the passenger arrival rate (λ), and the ride fare (p f ) all reach a maximum, while the pickup time (t p ) and the occupancy or utilization rate reach a minimum. Raising the minimum wage beyond $29.2 will lead to a reduction in number of drivers hired as predicted by the standard labor market model.
Thus contrary to common belief, a higher minimum wage up to the appropriate level will benefit drivers, more of whom are hired at higher wages, as well as passengers who enjoy faster and cheaper rides, while the platform profit decreases (Figure 14 ). Since the platform profit is simply a monetary transfer in the model, the social welfare of the ride-hailing system is improved.
Remark 6. In referring to social welfare, we are ignoring the significant negative externalities of the platform noted earlier. These include congestion caused by the increased number of TNC vehicles, pollution caused by increased vehicle miles traveled, and rides that have replaced healthier options (such as biking and walking).
A truly remarkable fact is that the features of the cheap-lunch example obtain for all model parameters. To facilitate the discussion, define the solution to (14) as an explicit function of w to emphasize its dependence on the wage floor, i.e., (N * (w), λ * (w), p * f (w), p * d (w)). We have the following theorem. Theorem 1. Consider any parameters (N 0 , λ 0 , α, β) and any distributions F p (·) and F d (·), for which (10) is feasible. Then ∇ + N * (w) > 0. Here ∇ + denotes the right-hand derivative, andw is the driver's wage at the solution to (9) .
The proof of Theorem 1 can be found in Appendix. The theorem implies that the second regime always exists: when w ≤w, the minimum floor constraint (15c) is inactive, so the solution is in regime 1. When w =w, the right-hand derivative of N is strictly positive. This corresponds to the beginning of the second regime, where the platform hires more drivers, and both drivers and passengers are better off.
TNC decisions with cap on number of drivers
With a cap on the number of drivers, the platform pricing problem is changed to the following:
It is unnecessary to relax (18b), since the platform can always lower p d to increase its profit. This is a non-convex program, which we can also effectively solve via first order conditions. Proposition 4. Assume that reservation cost and reservation wage are uniformly distributed: F p (c) = min{e p c, 1} and F d (w) = min{e d w, 1}, where e p ∈ R and e d ∈ R are constants. Then the rst order conditions of (17) admit a unique solution (p f , p d , λ, N ), which is the globally optimal solution to (17) .
The proof is deferred to Appendix, and the rst order conditions of (17) are dened in the proof.
Consider a cap N cap on the number of TNC drivers. We evaluate the platform's prot-maximizing decision (17) for dierent levels of N cap . We use the same model parameters as in Section 5.1 and we focus on uniform distributions of reservation costs and wages.
Figures 15-21 exhibit the market response to dierent caps on the total number of vehicles. These responses include the arrival rates of passengers, occupancy rate, platform prices, driver wage, pickup time and platform prot. It is more instructive to read the gures from right to left, as the cap decreases. As the cap decreases, the supply of vehicles drops (Figure 15 ), so it is harder for passengers to get a ride ( Figure   16 ). In this case, pickup time increases (Figure 19 ), and the number of rides decreases. Here are some interesting observations:
• The platform loses passengers faster than it loses drivers. This is evidenced by the drop in occupancy ( Figure 17 ).
• The pickup time increases at an increasing rate ( Figure 19 ). This is just a counterpart of the aforementioned network externality.
• Both trip fare and driver wage drop (Figures 18, 20) .
These observations can be explained. As the cap reduces the number of drivers, the passenger pickup time increases. Since t p is a decreasing convex function of N , it has an increasing derivative as N decreases. Therefore customers leave the platform at an increasing rate as N cap decreases. This rate is greater than the decreasing rate of N cap , so occupancy rate decreases. In this case, the platform loses passengers very Proposition 4. Assume that reservation cost and reservation wage are uniformly distributed: F p (c) = min{e p c, 1} and F d (w) = min{e d w, 1}, where e p ∈ R and e d ∈ R are constants. Then the rst order conditions of (17) admit a unique solution (p f , p d , λ, N ), which is the globally optimal solution to (17) .
These observations can be explained. As the cap reduces the number of drivers, the passenger pickup time increases. Since t p is a decreasing convex function of N , it has an increasing derivative as N decreases. Therefore customers leave the platform at an increasing rate as N cap decreases. This rate is greater than the decreasing rate of N cap , so occupancy rate decreases. In this case, the platform loses passengers very 13 Proposition 4. Assume that reservation cost and reservation wage are uniformly distributed: F p (c) = min{e p c, 1} and F d (w) = min{e d w, 1}, where e p ∈ R and e d ∈ R are constants. Then the rst order conditions of (17) admit a unique solution (p f , p d , λ, N ), which is the globally optimal solution to (17) .
Figures 15-21 exhibit the market response to dierent caps on the total number of vehicles. These responses include the arrival rates of passengers, occupancy rate, platform prices, driver wage, pickup time and platform prot. It is more instructive to read the gures from right to left, as the cap decreases. As the cap decreases, the supply of vehicles drops (Figure 15 ), so it is harder for passengers to get a ride ( Figure   16 ). In this case, pickup time increases (Figure 19) , and the number of rides decreases. Here are some interesting observations:
These observations can be explained. As the cap reduces the number of drivers, the passenger pickup time increases. Since t p is a decreasing convex function of N , it has an increasing derivative as N decreases. Therefore customers leave the platform at an increasing rate as N cap decreases. This rate is greater than the decreasing rate of N cap , so occupancy rate decreases. In this case, the platform loses passengers very 13 , p d , λ, N ) , which is the globally optimal solution to (17) .
The proof is deferred to Appendix, and the first order conditions of (17) are defined in the proof.
Consider a cap N cap on the number of TNC drivers. We evaluate the platform's profit-maximizing decision (17) for different levels of N cap . We use the same model parameters as in Section 5.1 and we focus on uniform distributions of reservation costs and wages.
Figures 15-21 exhibit the market response to different caps on the total number of vehicles. These responses include the arrival rates of passengers, occupancy rate, platform prices, driver wage, pickup time and platform profit. It is more instructive to "read" the figures from right to left, as the cap decreases. As the cap decreases, the supply of vehicles drops (Figure 15 ), so it is harder for passengers to get a ride ( Figure  16 ). In this case, pickup time increases (Figure 19) , and the number of rides decreases. Here are some interesting observations:
• The platform loses passengers faster than it loses drivers. This is evidenced by the drop in occupancy (Figure 17 ).
These observations can be explained. As the cap reduces the number of drivers, the passenger pickup time increases. Since t p is a decreasing convex function of N , it has an increasing derivative as N decreases. Therefore customers leave the platform at an increasing rate as N cap decreases. This rate is greater than the decreasing rate of N cap , so occupancy rate decreases. In this case, the platform loses passengers very quickly, and has to reduce trip prices to keep passengers from leaving. This further squeezes driver pay ( Figure 20) .
A surprising fact is that the cap on number of drivers hurts the earning of drivers (Figure 20 ). This is contrary to the common belief that limiting their number will protect drivers, as expressed in the regulation freezing the number of TNC vehicles in New York for one year [9] . This happens because the platform hires drivers with lowest reservation wage first. In other words, when a smaller cap on the number of drivers is imposed, the platform responds by reducing driver pay and hiring drivers with lower reservation costs. Thus the benefit of limiting supply is intercepted by the platform.
Remark 7. Under different parameters, it is possible to find cases in which p f first increases and then decreases as N cap decreases. Mathematically this occurs because the derivative of t p is initially smaller than the decreasing rate of drivers. However, the driver wage p d keeps decreasing throughout the regime. This supports the argument that the platform will not share its profits with drivers under the cap constraint.
Extensions
We formulate some extensions of the basic model to examine platform subsidy, platform competition and autonomous mobility on demand.
Platform Subsidy
The ride-hailing platform company is not always a short-term profit maximizer. In early stages, it tries to grow its business via subsidies to both passengers and drivers. To model this, we consider a ride-hailing platform that sets prices to maximize the number of rides or passengers λ subject to a reservation revenue R, which may be positive or negative (negative R indicates subsidy):
For notational convenience, let (λ , p f , p d ) be the solution to (19) , and denote (λ,p f ,p d ) as the solution to the non-subsidy case (9) .
We define subsidy as f = p f −p f and d =p d − p d , where f and d represent the subsidy to passengers and drivers, respectively. Note that this definition essentially compares (p f , p d ) to the profit-maximizing prices. For ease of understanding, we define B =λ(p f −p d ) − R as the subsidy budget. When reservation revenue is the maximal profit, i.e., R =λ(p f −p d ), the subsidy budget is 0, and f = d = 0.
We estimate the platform's ridership under different subsidies. To this end, we use the same model parameters as in Section 5.1. Simulation results, presented in Figure 22-25 , show that the platform should subsidize passengers more than it does drivers. Another interesting observation is that it should always subsidize both sides of the market, regardless of the subsidy level. 
Platform Competition
Consider two platforms (e.g., Uber and Lyft) competing with each other to maximize their prots. The prots are coupled through the market response to the joint decisions of both platforms: passengers choose the platform with cheaper overall cost, and drivers work for the platform with a higher wage rate. This subsection modies the model to capture this competition.
Each platform selects its passenger fare and driver wage. Passengers and drivers respond to the platform prices until the market settles down. Assume that when the market settles down, both platforms survive (with positive number of passengers and drivers). In this case neither passengers nor drivers deviate from their choice of platform at the market equilibrium, so the passenger costs and driver wages for the two platforms are equal. This gives rise to the following prot maximization problem for one platform, given the pricing decisions (p f , p d ) of its competitor: max Each platform selects its passenger fare and driver wage. Passengers and drivers prices until the market settles down. Assume that when the market settles down, (with positive number of passengers and drivers). In this case neither passengers n their choice of platform at the market equilibrium, so the passenger costs and d platforms are equal. This gives rise to the following prot maximization problem the pricing decisions (p f , p d ) of its competitor: max 
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Each platform selects its passenger fare and driver wage. Passengers and drivers respond to the platform prices until the market settles down. Assume that when the market settles down, both platforms survive (with positive number of passengers and drivers). In this case neither passengers nor drivers deviate from their choice of platform at the market equilibrium, so the passenger costs and driver wages for the two platforms are equal. This gives rise to the following prot maximization problem for one platform, given the pricing decisions (p f , p d ) of its competitor: max
Constraints (22a) and (22b) guarantee that if both platforms have positive number of passengers and drivers, then the passenger cost and driver wage in the two platforms are the same, so no passenger or driver has the incentive to switch platforms. Note that the market outcomes (N, λ, N , λ ) are not given. Instead, 
Constraints (22a) and (22b) guarantee that if both platforms have positive number of passengers and drivers, then the passenger cost and driver wage in the two platforms are the same, so no passenger or driver has the incentive to switch platforms. Note that the market outcomes (N, λ, N , λ ) are not given. Instead, 15 Figure 25 : Occupancy rate under different subsidy budgets.
Consider two platforms (e.g., Uber and Lyft) competing with each other to maximize their profits. The profits are coupled through the market response to the joint decisions of both platforms: passengers choose the platform with cheaper overall cost, and drivers work for the platform with a higher wage rate. This subsection modifies the model to capture this competition.
Each platform selects its passenger fare and driver wage. Passengers and drivers respond to the platform prices until the market settles down. Assume that when the market settles down, both platforms survive (with positive number of passengers and drivers). In this case neither passengers nor drivers deviate from their choice of platform at the market equilibrium, so the passenger costs and driver wages for the two platforms are equal. This gives rise to the following profit maximization problem for one platform, given the pricing decisions (p f , p d ) of its competitor: max
Constraints (22a) and (22b) guarantee that if both platforms have positive number of passengers and drivers, then the passenger cost and driver wage in the two platforms are the same, so no passenger or driver has the incentive to switch platforms. Note that the market outcomes (N, λ, N , λ ) are not given. Instead, they are governed by the market equilibrium conditions (22a)-(22d) and the platform prices (p f , p d , p f , p d ).
One difference between (21)-(22d) and the monopoly case (9)-(10b) is that in the former the waiting time for each TNC depends on the number of its own idle vehicles rather than the sum of the idle vehicles of the two platforms. The second difference, by contrast, is that the wage rate (22d) is determined by the sum of the demand for drivers by both platforms.
Analogously, the second platform's decisions (p f , p d ) will maximize its own profits given the decisions (p f , p d ) of the first. The solution of the two decision problems will be a Nash equilibrium.
Due to non-convexity of (21) , the question of existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium remains open. It is possible that the two platforms will split the heterogeneous passengers, with one platform offering a higher fare, lower waiting time, luxury rides to passengers with higher reservation cost.
Autonomous Vehicles
Autonomous vehicles (AV) will revolutionize road transportation. AV companies claim they will banish 94 percent of all accidents attributed to human error [23] . So commuters can sit back and relax, work, or entertain themselves. Eventually there will be hardly any need for human drivers. The impact on our lives will be profound. Uber and Lyft have R&D efforts to build self-driving ride-hailing vehicles. Billions of venture capital are flowing into the race to develop AVs.
We model a company that owns and operates a fleet of autonomous vehicles to provide autonomous mobility on demand (AMoD) service [21, 22] , and compare it to a ride-hailing service with human drivers. We modify the model (9)-(10b) to relate the decisions of an AMoD monopoly and those of a TNC monopoly. The AMoD monopoly will set its ride rates to maximize its profit (23) subject to demand (24):
Here N is the number of deployed AVs and c av is the investment and operating cost of an AV. Comparing this with the TNC decision making model (9)-(10b) we get a straightforward formal identification:
number of AVs deployed . = number of drivers hired, and wage rate w . = c av vehicle cost.
Following the NYTLC ruling, we take w = $27.86 per hour or an annual cost of $55,000 for 2,000 hours per year of driver (plus vehicle) service. So for the AMoD monopoly to be as profitable as the TNC monopoly (23) implies that an AV's investment and operating cost should be smaller than $55,000. How likely is this?
Today's AVs do not meet this cost target. In records submitted to the California Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) Waymo reported that in its 2017 AV tests its safety drivers disengaged autonomous driving once every 5,500 miles [23] . Waymo reports a disengagement when its evaluation process identifies the event as having 'safety significance', so this rate is almost 100 times worse than the estimated 500,000 miles per accident in 2015 for human drivers. With this poor safety performance, each AV will require a safety driver, making its total cost more than twice today's TNC cost. Of course AV safety will improve over time with more and more testing and R&D but it's anyone's guess as to when an AV will perform as safely as human drivers.
Alternatively, AMoD service can be scaled back to very controlled environments that reduce the risk of accidents by a factor of 100. That direction is also being pursued. For example, Waymo is providing rides to 400 people in the calm, sunny suburb of Chandler, AZ [24] . These AMoD rides use AVs with a safety driver.
One additional piece of evidence also suggests that the cost of AVs is very high. Two proposed contracts show the leasing cost of AV cars and shuttles of well over $100,000 each per year [25] . EasyMile is charging more than $27,000 a month per small electric shuttle for cities that sign up for one year of service. Drive.ai charges $14,000 monthly per vehicle for one year. Considering that a TNC driver (with car) costs $55,000 per year or $4,400 per month, it seems unlikely that these are viable business models, except in selective subsidized niche markets. 9
Conclusion
This paper analyzed the impact of two regulations on the ride-hailing app-based platforms or TNCs like Uber and Lyft: (a) a floor under driver wage and (b) a cap on total number of drivers. We constructed a general equilibrium model to predict market responses to the platform's decision on fares and wages, with and without these regulations. We showed that imposing a wage floor increases driver employment, lowers pickup time, decreases ride cost, and attracts more passengers, over a wide range of parameters. In contrast with labor market studies of minimum wage, our analysis suggests that a higher minimum wage benefits both drivers and passengers, at the expense of platform profits. On the other hand, a cap on the number of drivers or vehicles hurts drivers, as the platform benefits by hiring cheaper drivers when supply is limited. Variants of our model were analyzed from other perspectives as well, including platform subsidy, platform competition and autonomous vehicles. Interest in TNC regulation has been driven by concerns about working conditions of TNC drivers and by the deleterious impact on urban transport of TNC growth. This paper deals only with the impact on driver wage and ride fare. There is a debate whether TNC drivers are more like 'independent contractors' or more like employees [26] . This paper contributes to that debate in showing that TNC driver wages can be significantly increased and passenger fares decreased at the cost of lower TNC profits.
A: Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. We prove the result in two steps. (i) First, we consider the case of a passenger located at the origin and N I = N − λ/µ idle vehicles uniformly and independently distributed in a disk of radius R centered at the origin. We show that the expected distance of the passenger to the closest idle vehicle is
). (ii) Second, based on the result of part (i), we show that for a city with any two-dimensional area A, the expected shortest distance to an idle vehicle of a passenger is also given by
).
(i) To prove the first step, let d(n) := min(|x 1 |, · · · , |x n |) be the shortest distance to the origin among n idle vehicles where x i ∈ R 2 is the location of the ith idle vehicle. Then the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of d(n) is
Therefore, the probability density function (pdf) of d is
Consequently,
in which the fifth equality follows from an iterative application of integration by parts (similar to the one that leads to the third equality). Therefore, (for any N I 0 )
Next, we prove that n i=m 2i 2i+1 = √ m √ n (1 + O(m)) for m < n. We have,
.
(ii)We cannot directly apply the result of part (i) for a passenger with an arbitrary location inside A. Nevertheless, based on the result of part (i) we can iteratively provide an approximation. For every point x ∈ A consider a disk B r (x) of radius r > 0 around x, r > 0. We partition A into two sets C and D, where (a) C = {x ∈ A : B r (x) ⊂ A} is the set of points such that B r (x) is contained in A , and (b) let D := {x ∈ A : B r (x) ⊂ A} is the set of points such that B r (x) is not completely contained in A.
In the following, we first determine an approximate of E{d(x)|N I idle vehicles} for x ∈ C. We then provide an upper bound approximation for E{d(x)|N I idle vehicles} for x ∈ D. Putting the results of (ii-a) and (ii-b) together we provide an approximate equation for a general shape A; see (Iteration 1). We then use the approximation provided in (Iteration 1), to provide a better approximation for E{d(x)|N I idle vehicles} for x ∈ D, and improve our approximation for a general shape A; see (Iteration 2). We repeat the above process iteratively, and determine the best approximation by analyzing the limit point of the above iterative process which leads to the final approximation N I 0 E{d(N I 0 )} 1
. A and variance N I
Let l := {max |y − z| : x, y ∈ A} denote the largest distance between two points in A. Then, for every realization of m > 1, the conditional expected shortest distance of an idle vehicle to x is given by N I 0 πr 2 E{d(N I 0 πr 2 )} 1 √ m 1 + O max{(N I 0 πr 2 ) −1 , m −1 } 1{m > 0} + O(l)1{m = 0} from part (i) where 1{·} denotes the indicator function. Note that we modify the expression from part (i) since the shortest distance of an idle vehicle cannot exceed l when m = 0. Moreover, we substitute N I 0 with N I 0 πr 2 A to reflect the fact among the N I 0 idle vehicles uniformly distributed in A, on average N I 0
Taking the expectation with respect to m, the expected shortest distance of an idle vehicle to x is given by
We can write the first term in this expectation as
where the last equality is by Taylor expansion for terms 
Consequently, P{m > 0} = 1 − P{m = 0} = 1 + O(exp(−N 2δ I )). Substituting P{m > 0} and P{m = 0} in (25), we get
for x ∈ C(x) and δ ∈ (0, 1/2].
(ii-b) For points x ∈ D, consider the intersection of B r (x) and A. We assume that |Br(x)∩A| r 2 = O(1) since A has a smooth boundary. (Here |R| is the area of R.) Apply an argument similar to the one given in (ii-a) for B r (x) ∩ A, and we can show that with large enough probability the closest idle vehicles to x has a distance smaller than r. More precisely, ). Therefore, from (29),
for x ∈ D, where the first equality follows from
Therefore, for x ∈ D, we can write
we have, 
Setting δ = 5 22 , we have an improved approximation
where we neglect O(exp(−N (Iteration K) We can iterate the same process similar to the one described in iteration 2. Assume that at the end of iteration K − 1 we show that
(34)
where α(K − 1) ∈ (0, 1 2 ]. Note that in iteration 2 we have α(2) = 6 11 . We now use (34) to provide a better approximation for x ∈ D and iterate the process another time. Once again note that the number 
for x ∈ D.
Using (28) 10 We note that the number of vehicles in D is a random variable. Nevertheless, considering the variation in the number of vehicles around the average of N 1 2 +δ I one can follow a similar approach we used in (ii-a) using Taylor expansion, and show that the error term due to such a randomness is smaller than other error terms and does not affect the result. 11 We note that the closest idle vehicles for x ∈ D does not necessarily belong to D and can be inside C. Nevertheless, we can still use (31) for the expected distance of the closest idle vehicle for x. This is because for area D we can follow an argument similar to the one that leads to (31), and divide it to an interior regionC and an exterior regionD, ; however, we consider the border of D that separates it from C as a part of the interior regionC (and notD). Consequently, equation (31) is also applicable for x ∈ D.
Setting δ = 2−α(K−1) 2(2+α(K−1)) , we have an improved approximation for iteration K as Iterating the above process, it is easy to show that the sequence of α(K) = 2α(K−1) 2+α(K−1) converges to α * = 0.
Therefore, we have Proof. To prove Proposition 2, we first show that there is at most one solution to (12) . Then we show that this solution exists, and coincides with the globally optimal solution to (9) .
Uniqueness: let f p (c) and f d (w) be the probability density function of c and w, respectively. Since c and w are subject to uniform distribution, we have: f p (c) = e p * 1 epc≤1 and f d (w) = e d * 1 e d w≤1 , where 1 A is the indicator function of A. Assume for the moment that (12) admits a non-trivial solution. Denote it as (p f ,p d ,λ,Ñ ), and denotec andw as the corresponding passenger cost and driver wage, respectively. We first show that e pc ≤ 1 and e dw ≤ 1. This is because if e pc > 1, then λ = N = 0, this is a trivial solution.
If e dw > 1, we can decreasep d without affectingλ, indicating that ∂Π ∂p d < 0, which contradicts with (12b).
Therefore, we can rewrite (12c) This can be further simplified to:
It suffices to show that there exists at most one set of (p f ,p d ,λ) that satisfies (12a), (12b) and (37). Using the implicit function theorem on (37), we can derive ∂λ p f and ∂λ p d , thus (12a)-(12b) becomes: 
where (39a) directly follows from (38b), (39b) follows from (38a) and (38b), and (39c) are derived by plugging (39b) into (39a).
Assume there is another solution, denoted (p f , p f , λ , N ). Without loss of generality, suppose p f ≤p f . If p f <p f , then there are three cases:
• p d ≥p d . Based on (37), we have λ >λ. However, (39c) dictates that λ <λ. A contradiction.
• p d <p d and N 0 e d p d λ − λ /µ ≥ N 0 e dpdλ −λ/µ. Note that (39a) is equivalent to: As p f <p f and p d /λ >p d /λ, (42) indicates that λ >λ. A contradiction.
If p f =p f and p d <p d , then we can find a contradiction by exactly the same argument. In addition, if p f =p f and p d =p d , we can conclude that λ =λ and N =Ñ . The proof of 1 can be found in Appendix-F. Based on Lemma 1, the proof of uniqueness is completed.
Existence and Optimality: since (9) is an optimization of a continuous function over a compact domain D, there exists an optimal solution. When (p f , p d ) is at the boundary of D, the objective value is 0. Therefore, the optimal solution to (9) is in the interior of D, and the first order conditions are satisfied at the optimal solution, i.e., ∂Π ∂p f = ∂Π ∂p d = 0 at (p f ,p d ). This indicates that (12) has at least one solution. On
The proof of Lemma 2 can be found in Appendix G. It provides a procedure to compute the solution to (14) : first computeN andN by solving (44) and (46) respectively, then identify which case of (a), (b), (c) applies, and obtain N * correspondingly.
First-order condition: given Lemma 2, it suffices to show that the first order conditions of (44), (46) and (48) admit a unique solution that is optimal, when the reservation cost and wage are subject to uniform distributions.
The first order conditions of (44) are: 
Plug this into (45), then we get:
Based on (53), ifp f >p f andN >N , thenλ <λ. A contradiction.
Ifp f =p f , we can also obtain contradiction using the same argument, by using the fact thatN −λ /µ = N −λ/µ. In addition, the proof of existence and optimality is similar to that of Proposition 2. See details in Appendix-B.
The first order conditions of (46) are        λ 0 e p βµp f = λµ + λλ 0 e p αM 2(N − λ/µ) 3/2 (54a) 1 2 λ 0 e p αM p f µ = wµ(N − λ/µ) 3/2 + 1 2 wλ 0 e p αM (54b)
Multiply both sides of (54a) by 1 λ (N − λ/µ) 3/2 , and multiply both sides of (54b) by 1/w. After this, the right hand side of (54a) and (54b) are equal, and we get:
Plugging (55) into (54b), we get:
Plugging (55) and (56) into (47), we get:
Due to concavity of the right-hand side with respect to λ, there is a unique λ > 0 that satisfies (57). Therefore, the first order conditions (54) admit a unique solution. In addition, the proof of existence and optimality is similar to that of Proposition 2. See details in Appendix-B.
The proofs for the first order conditions of (48) are similar and much easier, so we omit the details.
D: Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. To solve (17), we first obtain the solution to (9) and denote it as (p f ,p d ,λ,Ñ ). IfÑ ≤ N cap , then the cap constraint (18c) is inactive, and (17) reduces to (9) .
IfÑ > N cap , then (18c) is active. In this case, (18a) and (18b) Proof. Let (p * f , λ * , N * ), (p f ,λ,N ) and (p f ,λ,N ) be the optimal solution (43), (44) and (46), respectively. Define R * ,R andR as the corresponding optimal values. Note that R * ≤R and R * ≤R. This is because the objective value of (43) is smaller than that of (44) and (46). We consider the following three cases:
• Π 1 (N ) < Π 2 (N ). Given N , the optimization problems (44) and (46) are equivalent (since the second term of the objective functions are constants). Therefore, the corresponding optimal solution (i.e., λ and p f ) are the same when N are the same, and Π 1 (N ) − Π 2 (N ) = wN − g(N ) for any N . This indicates that g(N ) > wN . It further implies that the objective value of (43) can attainR when N =N . Since R * is upper bounded byR, we conclude that N * =N .
• Π 2 (N ) < Π 1 (N ). In this case we have N * =N . Proof is the same as case (a).
• Π 1 (N ) ≥ Π 2 (N ) and Π 2 (N ) ≥ Π 1 (N ). In this case, we can show that g(N * ) = wN * . Assume not, then without loss of generality, consider the case where g(N * ) > wN * . Consider the following problem: max
We conclude that N * is the optimal solution to (61). This is because if not, then there exists another solution that satisfies (62) and obtains a higher value than R * , which contradicts with the fact that N * is optimal solution to (43). Since g(N * ) > wN * , the constraint (62b) is inactive at the optimal solution to (61), therefore, it is equivalent to (44), i.e., N * =N . In this case, g(N * ) > wN * implies g(N ) > wN . Since Π 1 (N ) − Π 2 (N ) = wN − g(N ) for any N , we have Π 1 (N ) < Π 2 (N ). This contradicts with the assumption that Π 1 (N ) ≥ Π 2 (N ). Therefore, g(N * ) = wN * . This indicates that both (15b) and (15c) are active at the optimal solution to (14) , which leads to (48).
This completes the proof.
